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MENTAL HEALTH ARTICLES
A NEW ERA BEGINS:
MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM IN VIRGINIA
Jane D. Hickey, * Allyson K Tysinger, ** and William C. Mims***
I. INTRODUCTION
Amidst calls for mental health reform and a sense of urgency stemming
from the tragic events at Virginia Tech, the 2008 session of the Virginia
General Assembly convened. The legislative reaction was overwhelming:
Legislators introduced a vast array of bills relating to mental health. By the
end of the session, the General Assembly enacted the most sweeping revi-
sions to Virginia's mental health laws since the 1970s.
The Virginia Tech tragedy was not the only impetus for reform. With
advocates, individuals with mental illness, family members, and mental
health caregivers calling for improvements to our mental health commit-
ment process and service delivery system, the Chief Justice of the Virginia
Supreme Court established the Virginia Commission on Mental Health Law
Reform in October 2006.1 The Commission was established to address
* Senior Assistant Attorney General/Chief, Health Services Section, Office of the Attorney General of
Virginia. B.A., 1972, College of William & Mary; J.D., 1977, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College
of William & Mary.
** Senior Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General. B.S., 1990, Wake Forest Univer-
sity; J.D., 1993, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
*** Chief Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General. B.A., 1979, College of William &
Mary; J.D., 1984, George Washington University; LL.M., 1986, Georgetown University.
1. Comm'n on Mental Health Law Reform, Fact Sheet, Oct. 11, 2006, available at
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calls for improvement from the mental health community, to "conduct a
comprehensive examination of Virginia's mental health laws and services,"
and to balance the needs of people with mental illness with the interests of
their families and communities. 2 The Commission was given the task of
studying access to services, the civil commitment process, the special needs
of children and adolescents, consumer empowerment and self-
determination, and mental health treatment in the criminal justice system. 3
To inform the work of the Commission, the University of Virginia's
School of Medicine produced a report on commitment practices.4 The re-
port painted a gloomy picture of a commitment process in crisis. Most
troublesome was the finding that civil commitment practices were not well
integrated into a high functioning mental health delivery system that en-
sured access to care. 5 With this report in hand, the Commission set out to
identify problems within Virginia's mental health system and recommend
improvements. At this point, tragic events overtook the work of the Com-
mission.
On April 16, 2007, one student, Seung Hui Cho, killed thirty-two and in-
jured many other students and faculty on the Virginia Tech campus. 6 In
conducting its review of the murders, the Virginia Tech Review Panel noted
that Virginia's mental health laws were flawed, services were inadequate,
widespread confusion existed as to the requirements of health privacy laws,
and the law governing commitment reports made to the Central Criminal
Records Exchange in order to prevent the purchase of firearms was inade-
quate. 7
By the end of the 2008 General Assembly session, Virginia's mental
health laws had undergone an historic overhaul, with changes in five key
areas: commitment criteria, mandatory outpatient treatment, procedural im-
provements, privacy and disclosure provisions, 8 and firearms purchase and
http://www.dmhmrsas.virginia.gov/documents/CMHLRfactsheet.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. ELIZABETH L. MCGARVEY, UNIV. OF VA., CIVIL COMMITMENT PRACTICES IN VIRGINIA:
PERCEPTIONS, ATTITUDES, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 1 (2007), available at
http://dls.state.va.us/GROUPS/HWI/meetings/090607/FocusGroup.pdf (hereinafter MCGARvEY,
PERCEPTIONS].
5. Id. at 2.
6. Theresa Vargas & Michael Alison Chandler, Classes Resume Amid Empty Desks: Mourning Virginia
Tech Seeks Normalcy, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2007, at Al.
7. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, MASS SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH: REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL 2
(2007), available at http://www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index/html (last visited Apr. 25, 2008).
8. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts _. The preceding four areas of change were addressed by House Bill 499. Id. An identical bill
was introduced in the Senate as Senate Bill 246. S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008). This
2
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reporting requirements. 9 In addition, the mental health system received an
infusion of more than $41 million to increase service capacity. 10 By all ac-
counts, the actions of the General Assembly in this area were its most ex-
haustive and comprehensive in more than thirty years.
II. ADDITIONAL APPROPRIATIONS
All agree that any reform of Virginia's mental health laws cannot be ac-
complished without the availability of adequate services in the community
to address the needs of persons with mental illness.1 1 The Virginia Tech
Review Panel strongly recommended that Virginia study the level of com-
munity outpatient service capacity required and any related costs for an
adequate response to both involuntary court-ordered and voluntary referrals
for services. 12 The Panel also recommended that the number and capacity
of secure crisis stabilization units be expanded to ensure that beds are avail-
able for individuals subject to temporary detention orders. 13 Thus, the Gen-
eral Assembly appropriated over $41 million 14 in additional funding to pro-
vide mental health services in the community.
III. COMMITMENT CRITERIA
The most significant change enacted by the General Assembly was the
article, however, will refer only to House Bill 499 for the sake of simplicity. House Bill 401 and House
Bill 559 are related bills, and this article will reference them only when particularly relevant. H.B. 401,
Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); H.B. 559, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
9. H.B. 709, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 854, 2008 Va.
Acts. _); H.B. 815, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 788,
2008 Va. Acts j.
10. H.B. 29, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 827, 2008 Va.
Acts _); H.B. 30, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of May 9, 2008, ch. 879, 2008
Va. Acts _).
11. COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 9
(2007), available at http://www.courts.state.va.us/cmh/2007_022 1preliminaryreport.pdf [hereinafter
COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT].
12. See VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 7, at 60-61.
13. Id at61.
14. H H.B. 29, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 827, 2008
Va. Acts 9; H.B. 30, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of May 9, 2008, ch. 879,
2008 Va. Acts _). These funds must be used to provide emergency mental health services, crisis sta-
bilization services, and inpatient and outpatient mental health services for individuals in need of emer-
gency mental health services or who meet the inpatient or outpatient criteria. H.B. 29, Va. Gen. Assem-
bly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 827, 2008 Va. Acts _). The General
Assembly also appropriated an additional $11 million the first year and $17.3 million the second year of
the biennium, which will be matched by the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, to es-
tablish six hundred additional community waiver slots for persons with mental retardation. Id.
2008]
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removal of the "imminent" requirement from the danger criterion for civil
commitment. Virginia and other states began tightening commitment crite-
ria in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 15 The combination of the Civil Rights
movement, which emphasized the protection of disenfranchised groups in-
cluding those with mental illness, and new constitutional law challenges
emphasizing treatment and rehabilitation in the least restrictive alternative1 6
prompted these changes. By the 1980s, psychiatrists and other mental
health advocacy groups began advocating a more therapeutic approach,
leading states to begin loosening commitment criteria.17 Prior to this 2008
session, Virginia was one of only five states requiring a finding of "immi-
nent danger" to commit a person to involuntary hospitalization. 18
A. Danger Prong
Under Virginia law prior to this session, an individual could be commit-
ted to involuntary inpatient treatment for up to one hundred eighty days if a
general district court judge or special justice found by clear and convincing
evidence that the individual "presents an imminent danger to himself or
others as a result of mental illness." 19 This criterion is subject to varying
interpretations throughout the Commonwealth. 20 Some judges and special
justices interpret "imminent danger" to mean "immediate" danger 21 while
one circuit court judge writes, "an imminent danger is a danger which is
likely to occur within a reasonably short, but not immediate period of time
unless appropriate treatment is provided. ' 22 Critics of the current standard
argue that it prevents the use of involuntary treatment until it is too late.23
15. Mark J. Mills, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill: An Overview, 484 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD.
OF POL. & SOC. SC. 28, 28-30 (1986).
16. See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,
575-76 (1975); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1103 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
17. See Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Research Continues to Challenge the Need for Outpatient
Commitment, 31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 109, 117 (2005).
18. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005); Treatment Advocacy Center, Summary of State
Assisted Treatment Standards: 50 States and DC, http://psychlaws.org/LegalResources/ATCriteria.htm
(last visited June 10, 2008).
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
20. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
21. But ef Memorandum from Charles E. Posten, Judge, Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to Chief
Judge (July 7, 2003) (on file with the Supreme Court of Virginia) (noting the existing process for defin-
ing "imminent danger" and the lack of support for the interpretation meaning "immediate").
22. Memorandum from Charles E. Poston, Judge, Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk to Chief Magis-
trate (July 15, 2003) (on file with the Supreme Court of Virginia).
23. See generally COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, DRAFT REPORT OF THE CIVIL
4
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They further argue that it inappropriately channels individuals from the
mental health system into jails and prisons where mental health issues are
not addressed adequately. 24
The Virginia Tech Review Panel recommended that the criteria for in-
voluntary commitment "be modified in order to promote more consistent
application of the standard and to allow involuntary treatment in a broader
range of cases involving severe mental illness. ' 25 The General Assembly
agreed. Effective July 1, 2008, the danger prong of Virginia's commitment
statute is relaxed to require the judge or special justice to find that "the per-
son has a mental illness and there is a substantial likelihood that, as a result
of mental illness, the person will, in the near future, (1) cause serious
physical harm to himself or others as evidenced by recent behavior causing,
attempting, or threatening harm and other relevant information, if any.....26
The phrase "in the near future" is further limited by requiring evidence of
"recent behavior causing, attempting, or threatening harm. '27 The General
Assembly believed, however, that this language might be too limiting.28
Therefore, the phrase "and other relevant information, if any," was added to
ensure that courts could consider any relevant information related to the po-
tential for harm in the near future.
The states are split on the inclusion of a temporal requirement, such as
"in the near future," in civil commitment laws. 29 Case law interpreting the
term is limited and varies from state to state. 30 For example, Illinois inter-
COMMITMENT TASK FORCE (2008) [hereinafter COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, CIVIL
COMMITMENT] (describing proposals to revise the standards for involuntary mental health treatment).
24. See id at 53.
25. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 7, at 60.
26. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts _) (emphasis added); see also H.B. 559, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of
Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 779, 2008 Va. Acts . The phrase "in the near future" replaces the term "immi-
nent." For those judges and special justices defining the term "imminent" to mean "immediate," the
time frame has been significantly broadened, but is arguably akin to "within a reasonably short, but not
immediate period of time unless appropriate treatment is provided." See supra notes 22-24 and accom-
panying text.
27. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts j.
28. Compare H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (as introduced Jan. 7, 2008), with H.B.
499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (as amended on the Senate floor Mar. 3, 2008).
29. Twenty-eight states have a temporal requirement but the remaining states have none. Treatment
Advocacy Center, Summary of State Assisted Treatment Standards: 50 States and DC,
http://psychlaws.org/LegalResources/ATCriteria.htm (last visited June 10, 2008). Of the states with a
temporal requirement, nine use "near future." Letter from William C. Mims, Chief Deputy Attorney
General, Virginia Office of the Attorney General to Robert B. Bell, Delegate, Virginia General Assem-
bly (Jan. 17, 2008) (on file with author).
30. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
2008]
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prets the temporal requirement as "within a reasonable time" 31 and requires
a reasonable expectation that a person will engage in future dangerous con-
duct.32 The mere presentation of past acts is insufficient without a predic-
tion of future dangerousness. 33
Thirty-four states also require an act or some behavior to meet the com-
mitment standard. 34 New Mexico, for example, defines "substantial likeli-
hood of serious harm to oneself' as "more likely than not that in the near
future the person will... cause serious bodily harm to [himself] by violent or
other self-destructive means"' 35 "as evidenced by [recent] behavior causing,
attempting or threatening the infliction of serious bodily harm to himself" 36
B. Inability to Care for Self Prong
The General Assembly also changed the second prong of the commit-
ment criteria to have more specificity. The "substantially unable to care for
self' language was changed to require that the person "has a mental illness
and that there is a substantial likelihood that, as a result of mental illness,
the person will, in the near future,.., suffer serious harm due to his lack of
capacity to protect himself from harm or to provide for his basic human
needs... ."37 The serious harm described is not limited to physical harm and
potentially may be broad enough to encompass other harms like serious fi-
nancial harm resulting from a person in a manic state spending his life sav-
ings. 38 Similarly, basic human needs are not limited to food, clothing, or
shelter, thereby permitting commitment in circumstances such as medically
necessary treatment.39 Finally, an individual may be ordered to involuntary
31. In the matter of Gregorovich, 89 111. App. 3d 528, 533, 411 N.E.2d 981, 985 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
32. In re Barnard, 247 Ill. App. 3d 234, 255-56, 616 N.E.2d 714, 729 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); Sullivan v.
Hay, 140 Ill. App. 3d 1007, 1010, 489 N.E.2d 889, 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
33. In re Interest of Blythman, 208 Neb. 51, 58, 303 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Neb. 1981).
34. Treatment Advocacy Center, Summary of State Assisted Treatment Standards: 50 States and DC,
http://psychlaws.org/LegalResources/ATCriteria.htm (last visited June 10, 2008). Eight states use the
newly adopted Virginia criteria requiring a recent act or behavior causing, attempting, or threatening
harm to show that the commitment standard is met. Id.
35. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 43-1-3(M) (1978) (emphasis added).
36. In the Matter of Pernell, 92 N.M. 490, 496, 590 P.2d 638, 644 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979).
37. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts j; H.B. 559, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 779,
2008 Va. Acts _J.
38. The mental health reform bills do not contain any language limiting the type of harm required under
the inability to care for self prong to physical harm. See H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess.
2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va. Acts 9; H.B. 559, Va. Gen. Assembly
(Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 779, 2008 Va. Acts j.
39. This statutory change reflects the fact that over half of involuntary commitments were based upon
the inability to care for self, rather than the dangerousness, criteria. See ELIZABETH L. McGARvEY,
UNIV. OF VA., A STUDY OF CIVIL COMMITMENT HEARINGS HELD IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF
6
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inpatient treatment for a period of time not to exceed thirty days. 40 Addi-
tional consecutive orders of involuntary inpatient treatment may be entered
for periods of up to one hundred eighty days each.41
IV. MANDATORY OUTPATIENT TREATMENT
The most important element of this session's mental health law reform
was the establishment of clear procedures for ordering, delivering and
monitoring less restrictive court-ordered outpatient treatment. These
changes make mandatory outpatient treatment more usable and ensure a
consistent statewide implementation. In addition, these procedures will in-
crease oversight by community services boards (CSBs) and other providers
to ensure that no one falls through the cracks. Most importantly, it may re-
duce hospitalizations and mental health crises for many people.
A. Criteria for Mandatory Outpatient Treatment
There are three types of mandatory outpatient treatment. First, a person
may be ordered to mandatory outpatient treatment as a least restrictive al-
ternative to inpatient treatment utilizing the same commitment criteria as for
involuntary inpatient treatment, as is the case in Virginia.42
Second, many states, including North Carolina, employ mandatory out-
patient treatment as a supplement to short-term acute hospitalization. 43 The
General Assembly considered enacting this provision but opted to study the
matter further. 44
Third, a separate and less rigid criteria may be utilized to impose manda-
tory outpatient treatment for individuals who do not yet meet the involun-
tary inpatient criteria to prevent future involuntary inpatient admission, a
commitment scheme enacted in various states, most notably in New York
as Kendra's Law. 45 The General Assembly also considered enacting this
VIRGINIA IN THE MONTH OF MAY 2007 18 (2008), available at
http://www.courts.state.va.us/cmh/2007 05 civil commitment-hearings.pdf [hereinafter MCGARvEY,
CIVIL COMMITMENT].
40. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts j.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-817(C) (Repl. Vol. 2005).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261, 267 (2007). Here, the court orders involuntary inpatient treatment
followed upon discharge by a period of mandatory outpatient treatment. Id.
44. See S.B. 274, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
45. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (Consol. 2007). Under this type of outpatient commitment
scheme, the person is experiencing a substantial deterioration in his previous level of functioning that
2008]
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type of legislation, but due to the potential fiscal impact associated with this
scheme and the current paucity of outpatient services for those seeking
treatment on a voluntary basis, the matter was carried over to the 2009 Gen-
eral Assembly session.46
The General Assembly did, however, clarify current law specifying the
conditions under which mandatory outpatient commitment can be ordered
as an alternative to inpatient treatment. 47 Most importantly, the General
Assembly provided: "less restrictive alternatives shall not be determined to
be appropriate unless the services are actually available in the community
and providers of the services have actually agreed to deliver the services. '48
Therefore, the court may not order mandatory outpatient treatment unless
the services are actually-not theoretically-available in the community
and the treatment providers have agreed to provide the services. The dura-
tion of the mandatory outpatient treatment order should be determined by
the court based upon the recommendation of the CSB but shall not exceed
ninety days. 49
The change in the commitment criteria may also increase the use of
mandatory outpatient treatment orders. At present, mandatory outpatient
treatment is ordered only 5.7% of the time. 50 Many special justices indicate
that, because of the very restrictive criteria employed in Virginia, individu-
als for whom involuntary treatment was sought were too dangerous or im-
paired to be ordered to outpatient treatment.
51
Lack of outpatient service capacity has been cited as another key reason
has led to involuntary inpatient admission in the past that will occur again unless some type of involun-
tary treatment is imposed. Id. § 9.60(c)(3)-(7).
46. See S.B. 177, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
47. The new law provides:
(b) less restrictive alternatives to involuntary inpatient treatment that would offer an opportunity for im-
provement of [the person's] condition have been investigated and are determined to be appropriate, and
(c) the person (A) has sufficient capacity to understand the stipulations of his treatment, (B) has ex-
pressed an interest in living in the community and has agreed to abide by his treatment plan, and (C) is
deemed to have the capacity to comply with the treatment plan and understand and adhere to conditions
and requirements of the treatment and services, and (d) the ordered treatment can be delivered on an
outpatient basis by the [CSB] or designated provider ....
H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts 9.
48. Id.
49. Id. Orders may be extended for consecutive periods up to 180 days. Id.
50. MCGARVEY, CIVIL COMMITMENT, supra note 39, at 17. This study was conducted just after the
shootings at Virginia Tech when the Department of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance
Abuse Services and the Office of the Attorney General were receiving anecdotal reports of increased use
of mandatory outpatient treatment. Id.
51. See id at 19 (indicating that only 26.2% of those cases resulting in an involuntary outpatient order
posed a danger to others).
8
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for the low number of mandatory outpatient treatment orders. The Inspec-
tor General for Mental Health, Mental Retardation and Substance Abuse
Services reported in his 2005 Review of the Virginia Community Services
Board Emergency Services Programs that the majority of CSBs do not pro-
vide a comprehensive range of emergency services. 52 The Inspector Gen-
eral followed this report with a 2007 Survey of CSB Outpatient Service Ca-
pacity and Commitment Hearing Attendance revealing that at least two
CSBs do not offer any outpatient services to adults.5 3 The lack of success is
compounded by extremely long wait times for appointments with clinicians
and psychiatrists. 54 With the additional appropriations and lowered com-
mitment criteria, mandatory outpatient treatment will become more widely
used in Virginia as outpatient services are increasingly available to indi-
viduals with severe mental illness.
B. Monitoring Mandatory Outpatient Treatment
The Virginia Tech Review Panel also highlighted the need for greater
specificity in monitoring mandatory outpatient treatment (MOT) orders. 55
The Panel recommended clarification of the appropriate recipients of or-
ders, the party responsible for certifying orders, the party responsible for
reporting noncompliance and to whom noncompliance is reported, the
mechanism for returning noncompliant persons to court, sanctions for non-
compliance, and the responsibilities of the CSB and treatment providers in
assuring effective implementation of orders. 56
The General Assembly addressed each of these issues, placing specific
monitoring and accountability responsibilities on CSBs. Any MOT order
must require the CSB where the person resides to monitor implementation
of the MOT plan and report material noncompliance to the court. 57 The
CSB must file a comprehensive MOT plan with the court for approval
52. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., REVIEW OF THE VIRGINIA COMMUNITY SERVICES BOARD
EMERGENCY SERVICES PROGRAM 3 (2005), available at http://www.oig.virginia.gov/documents/SS-
ESPFinalReportMay-August2005.pdf.
53. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SURVEY OF CSB OUTPATIENT SERVICE CAPACITY AND
COMMITMENT HEARING ATTENDANCE 21 (2007), available at
http://www.oig.virginia.gov/documents/VATechRptl4l-v2.pdf.
54. The Inspector General found that outpatient treatment capacity for adults actually decreased at 60%
ofthe CSBs. Id.
55. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 7, at 58.
56. Id. at 61.
57. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts j. Further, the MOT order must include an initial treatment plan that describes arrangements
made for the initial in-person appointment or contact with each service provider, identifies the specific
services, identifies the provider who has agreed to provide each service, and includes any other relevant
information available regarding the treatment ordered. Id.
2008]
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within five work days of entry of the order. 58 Any subsequent substantive
modifications, such as a change in service provider, must be filed with the
court for review and attached to the order. 59 If the CSB determines that
necessary services are not available or cannot be provided, it must notify
the court within five days of the MOT order's entry. 60
General district court clerks also received significant new responsibili-
ties. The clerk is required to provide a copy of the MOT order to the person
subject to the order, his attorney, and the CSB responsible for monitoring
compliance. 61 In addition, the court entering the MOT order may transfer
jurisdiction to the court where the person resides at any time after entry of
the MOT order. 62 The CSB must remain responsible for monitoring com-
pliance with the order until the local CSB receiving jurisdiction acknowl-
edges the transfer to the clerk of court. 63
The General Assembly also enacted a new section defining CSB moni-
toring obligations and requiring service providers identified in the MOT
plan to report material noncompliance to the CSB. 64 If the CSB determines
the person has materially failed to comply, it must petition the court for a
review of the MOT order within three days-or twenty-four hours if the
person is hospitalized under a temporary detention order-and recommend
an appropriate disposition to the court. 65 If the CSB determines the person
is not complying materially with the MOT order and also meets the com-
mitment criteria, it shall immediately request an emergency custody order
pursuant to Virginia Code section 37.2-808 or a temporary detention order
pursuant to section 37.2-809.66
The General Assembly further established a court review process cover-
58. Id. The comprehensive plan must
(i) identify the specific type, amount, duration, and frequency of each service ... , (ii) identify the pro-
vider that has agreed to provide each service .. . (iii) certify that the services are the most appropriate
and least restrictive treatment available for the person, (iv) certify that each provider has compiled and
continues to comply with applicable [licensing] provisions .... (v) be developed with the fullest possi-
ble involvement and participation of the person and reflect his preferences to the greatest extent possible
to support his recovery and self-determination, (vi) specify the particular conditions with which the per-
son shall be required to comply, and (vii) describe how the [CSB] shall monitor ... compliance with the
plan and report any material noncompliance ....
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. The CSB must, in turn, acknowledge receipt of the order on a form provided by the court. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
10
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ing all proceedings related to the MOT order.67 The court will be required
to hold a hearing to review the MOT order within five days of receiving the
petition. 68 The clerk is required to provide notice of the hearing to the per-
son, the CSB, all treatment providers, and the original petitioner.69 Prefer-
ence should be given to appointing the attorney who represented the person
at the initial hearing, but the same judge or special justice who presided at
the hearing at which the MOT order was entered is not required to conduct
the review hearing. 70
If requested by the person, the CSB, a treatment provider listed in the
MOT plan, or the original petition, a new examiner must be appointed to
conduct the same evaluation required under section 37.2-815 and advise the
court whether he believes the person continues to meet the commitment cri-
teria. 71 In addition, the CSB must offer to provide transportation to the ex-
amination if the person is not detained and has no other means of transpor-
tation. 72 If the person fails to appear at the examination, the CSB must
notify the court and the court is required to issue a mandatory examination
order and capias directing the primary law enforcement agency to transport
the person to the examination. 73 If the person fails to appear at the hearing,
the court must reschedule the hearing, issue an emergency custody order, or
issue a temporary detention order. 74
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court must order involuntary admis-
sion if the person meets the commitment criteria, renew the MOT order if
the person meets the criteria while making any necessary modifications ac-
ceptable to the CSB or treatment providers, or rescind the MOT order.71
The CSB may petition the court to rescind the MOT order at any time if
it determines the person has complied with the MOT order and no longer
meets the criteria or the order is no longer necessary. 76 If the court agrees
67. Id.
68. Id. According to the bill, "if the fifth day is a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday, the hearing shall
be held by the close of business on the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday." Id. If
the person is detained, the timeframe for holding a hearing for persons under a temporary detention or-
der applies. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. If the court is not available, the magistrate is responsible for issuing the mandatory examination
order and capias. Id. Detention under this order may not exceed four hours. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. Transportation to the inpatient treatment facility, if ordered, is provided by the sheriff or other
responsible person. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-829 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
76. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts 9.
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with the CSB, it must rescind the order; otherwise, it must schedule a hear-
ing for review of the order in accordance with section 37.2-817.2 of the
Code of Virginia. 77 The subject of the order may also petition the court to
rescind the order thirty days after entry of the MOT order, but only once in
a ninety day period. 78
Within thirty days prior to the MOT order's expiration, the CSB, any
treating physician, or other responsible person may petition to continue the
MOT order. 79 If the court schedules a hearing, it must appoint an examiner
to conduct another evaluation as provided in Virginia Code section 37.2-
815.80 The CSB must also provide a preadmission screening report.81 The
court may continue the MOT order for up to 180 days, making any changes
necessary in the order.8 2 If the MOT order expires before the hearing can
be held, the MOT order in effect at the time the petition for continuation is
filed remains in effect until the hearing. 83
V. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
In addition to modification of the commitment criteria and improvements
to mandatory outpatient treatment, the General Assembly addressed proce-
dural aspects of the civil commitment process. These amendments will
standardize the process across the Commonwealth and remedy problematic
aspects of the process.
The issuance of an emergency custody order is often the first step in the
civil commitment process. An emergency custody order is issued by a
magistrate upon a finding of probable cause to believe that an individual
meets the commitment criteria.84 The order authorizes law enforcement to
take the individual into custody and transport him for evaluation by a CSB
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. If the person and the CSB, when the CSB is not the petitioning party, agree to the extension, the
court must continue the order without a hearing. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808(A) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2007).
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designee skilled in the diagnosis and treatment of mental illness. 85
Under current law, the period of custody under an emergency custody
order cannot exceed four hours from the order's execution. 86 Much occurs
during the four hour period. The individual first must be transported to a
location where an assessment of the need for treatment can occur. 87 Once
transportation is complete, the individual will undergo a thorough mental
health evaluation. 88 If the evaluation determines the individual meets the
commitment criteria, the CSB employee or designee must locate a bed for
temporary detention during the emergency custody period. 89 The search for
a facility of temporary detention is often challenging and time-consuming.
Frequently, transportation, performance of medical and mental health
evaluations, and locating a temporary detention bed requires more time than
the statutory four hour period. The CSB employee or designee is then left
with the Hobson's choice of releasing an individual meeting the commit-
ment criteria or detaining him further without legal authority.
To help remedy this practical problem, the legislation authorized magis-
trates to grant a one time extension of an emergency custody order for up to
two hours upon a finding of good cause. 90 Good cause for an extension is
defined to include the need for additional time to identify a facility of tem-
porary detention or to complete a medical evaluation. 91
During the emergency custody period, the transporting law enforcement
officer maintains custody of the individual. 92 This can create a hardship
when officers are taken away from regular patrol duties for four or more
hours. Many law enforcement officers were understandably concerned
about extending the emergency custody period beyond the statutory four
hours. 93 To address these concerns, the legislation adds a provision to per-
85. Id. § 37.2-808(B)-(C).
86. Id. § 37.2-808().
87. Id. § 37.2-808(B). In rural or heavily congested areas, transportation can take a substantial portion
of the four hour period. COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra
note 11, at 1.
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808(B) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2007). In some circumstances, individu-
als in medical distress will require a medical evaluation prior to the mental health evaluation.
89. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-808(H), 37.2-809(D) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2007). If the CSB
does not locate a facility to place the person, a temporary detention order cannot issue and law enforce-
ment must release the person. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-808(H), 37.2-809(D) (Repl. Vol. 2005 &
Supp. 2007).
90. H.B. 583, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 784, 2008 Va.
Acts j. The extension can be requested by a family member of the individual, an employee or desig-
nee of the CSB, a treating physician, or a law enforcement officer. Id.
91. Id.
92. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-808(H) (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2007).
93. See DEPT. OF PLANNING AND BUDGET, 2008 FISCAL IMPACT STATEMENT: HB 401 (2008), avail-
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mit the law enforcement agency transporting an individual to transfer cus-
tody to the receiving facility "if it is licensed to provide the level of security
necessary to protect the individual and others from harm," is "capable of
providing the level of security necessary," and has entered into a transfer of
custody agreement with the law enforcement agency. 94
After a temporary detention order has been issued, an individual will
have an independent clinical evaluation. Under current law, a psychiatrist,
psychologist, or any mental health professional licensed through the De-
partment of Health Professions and qualified in the diagnosis of mental ill-
ness if a psychiatrist or psychologist is not available can serve as the inde-
pendent examiner.95 Beyond stating that the examiner must personally
examine the individual and certify whether he meets the commitment crite-
ria, current law is silent on what the examination is to include. 96 As a re-
sult, independent examinations vary considerably in thoroughness and con-
tent.
In considering the qualifications to be an independent examiner, the
General Assembly limited the types of mental health professionals who can
serve in such a role. Under the amended law, if a psychiatrist or psycholo-
gist is not available, only a licensed clinical social worker, professional
counselor, psychiatric nurse practitioner, or clinical nurse specialist can
qualify. 97 In addition, a professional other than a psychiatrist or psycholo-
gist must have completed a certification program approved by the Depart-
ment of Mental Health, Mental Retardation, and Substance Abuse Ser-
vices. 98
The legislature also added detailed provisions requiring the independent
examination to include a clinical assessment; substance abuse screening, if
indicated; risk assessment; assessment of the person's capacity to consent to
treatment; review of the temporary detention facility's records; discussion
of the person's treatment preferences; assessment of alternatives to involun-
tary inpatient treatment; and recommendations for the placement, care, and
treatment of the person. 99 This added specificity will hopefully standardize
able at http://legl.state.va.us/cgi-bin/legp5O4.exe?08 1+oth+HB401FH1122+PDF.
94. H.B. 401, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-815 (Repl. Vol. 2005 & Supp. 2007). There is no requirement that the pro-
fessional appointed complete training or certification regarding his responsibilities as an independent
examiner or the performance of the evaluation. See id.
96. See id.
97. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va.
Acts 9.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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independent examinations across the Commonwealth.
Another concern for both the Virginia Tech Review Panel and the Com-
mission on Mental Health Law Reform was that neither the CSB pre-
screener, nor the independent examiner, is required to attend the commit-
ment hearing. 100 Without their presence, clinical questions that may arise
during the hearing cannot be answered. It was also feared that without the
attendance of CSB personnel there would be an absence of oversight par-
ticularly in cases where an individual is ordered to mandatory outpatient
commitment. 101
In response to these concerns, the General Assembly mandated the atten-
dance of CSB personnel at all commitment hearings, either in person or
through electronic means. 102 The CSB that prepared the prescreening re-
port must send a representative to the hearing unless it is held outside of its
service area.10 3 Otherwise, arrangements shall be made for a representative
of the CSB serving the area where the hearing is held to attend the hearing
on behalf of the prescreening CSB. 104 In addition, the independent exam-
iner and the treating physician at the temporary detention facility must be
available during the hearing for questioning whenever possible through
electronic means. 105
VI. CONFIDENTIALITY AND DISCLOSURE PROVISIONS
The purpose of Virginia's civil commitment process is to provide treat-
ment to an individual and protect the individual and the public from harm
that the individual could potentially inflict upon himself or others. 106 Pri-
vacy issues abound in the civil commitment context. 107 On the one hand,
individuals with mental illnesses are understandably concerned with the
stigma and prejudice that can result from a disclosure of their mental health
100. COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-2; VA.
TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 7, at 57, 61.
101. COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 1-2.
102. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008
Va. Acts ).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. The Supreme Court of the United States has permitted states to use two justifications for civil
commitment laws consistent with constitutional due process protections. The first is the police power of
the state to "treat the individual's mental illness and protect him and society from his potential danger-
ousness." Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). The second is the state's legitimate interest
in "providing care to its citizens who are unable because of emotional disorders to care for themselves."
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
107. COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 11, at 21-22.
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information. On the other hand, evaluators and courts need personal infor-
mation to perform their roles effectively in the civil commitment process.
After the tragedy at Virginia Tech, questions also arose regarding the extent
to which the public should be able to access information regarding com-
mitment hearings. 108
Many health care providers questioned their ability to share health in-
formation with others involved in the civil commitment process given the
restrictions imposed by the HIPAA Privacy Rule. 10 9 The Virginia Tech
Review Panel found that while the federal law may not be an actual barrier
to disclosure there was a perception that disclosure was not permitted which
resulted in needed information not being shared.' 10
To ensure that all parties with a role in the civil commitment process can
access appropriate health information, the General Assembly enacted man-
datory disclosure provisions in title 16.1 for juvenile commitments, Ill title
19.2 for forensic commitments, 112 and title 37.2 for adult commitments. 113
A complimentary provision was also added to the Virginia Patient Health
Records Privacy Act.114 The new provisions require any health care pro-
vider supplying present or past services to a subject of a civil commitment
proceeding to disclose any information that is necessary and appropriate for
the performance of such duties to a magistrate, the court, the person's attor-
ney, the independent examiner, the CSB, or a law enforcement officer upon
request. 115 In addition, health care providers shall disclose information that
may be necessary for a person's treatment to any other health care provider
responsible for evaluating, providing services to, or monitoring the treat-
ment of the person. 116
The added provisions were carefully drafted to meet the requirements of
the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Under the HIPAA Privacy Rule, health care pro-
108. See VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 7, at 63.
109. See id. at 65.
110. Id. at 63.
111. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008
Va. Acts __). The provision will amend section 16.1-377 of the Virginia Code. Id.
112. Id. The Virginia Code section affected by this provision is 19.2-169.6. Id.
113. Id The provision will add section 37.2-804.2 to the Virginia Code. Id
114. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008
Va. Acts _).
115. Id.; H.B. 576, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 782, 2008
Va. Acts _).
116. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008
Va. Acts _); H.B. 576, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 782,
2008 Va. Acts _ ); S.B. 246, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008,
ch. 870, 2008 Va. Acts _).
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viders may disclose health information for treatment purposes. 117 As stated
in the preamble to the Rule, health care providers are "permitted to disclose
protected health information for treatment purposes regardless of to whom
the disclosure is made." 118 Thus, the HIPAA Privacy Rule allows providers
to disclose health information to the entities and individuals involved in the
civil commitment process, including the court, in order to obtain and deliver
treatment for the individual.
Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision permitting disclosures for
treatment purposes is sufficient to permit the mandatory new disclosure
provisions of House Bill 499, other HIPAA provisions also are applicable.
Providers can make disclosures under the HIPAA Privacy Rule to avert a
serious threat to the health or safety of a person or the public.11 9 This ex-
ception applies to many of the disclosures contained within House Bill 576.
In addition, providers may disclose health information to law enforcement
as required by law. 120 Finally, the HIPAA Privacy Rule permits providers
to disclose health information as required by law. 121
To further ease a provider's concerns about disclosing health information
in the context of a civil commitment proceeding, the General Assembly
mandated that orders entered in the civil commitment process, such as
emergency custody orders, temporary detention orders, and commitment
orders, provide for disclosures of health records pursuant to the new disclo-
sure provisions. 122 Because court orders will require the disclosure of
health information in the civil commitment process, such disclosures are
permissible under the HIPAA Privacy Rule provision permitting disclosures
pursuant to court orders. 123
Concerns were raised that the disclosure provisions, as they pertained to
law enforcement, were overly broad. 124 Therefore, the General Assembly
117. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506 (2007). Treatment is defined as the provision, coordination, or management
of health care and related services by one or more health care providers, including the coordination or
management of health care by a health care provider with a third party. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2007).
118. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 53182 (pro-
posed Aug. 14, 2002) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164).
119. 45 C.F.R. § 164.5120) (2007).
120. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2007).
121. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2007).
122. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008
Va. Acts _); H.B. 583, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 784,
2008 Va. Acts j.
123. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e)(1)(i) (2007).
124. Compare H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (as introduced Jan. 7, 2008), with H.B.
499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008 Va. Acts
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enacted limitations on law enforcement's access to health information. 125
Officers may only receive information necessary to protect the officer, the
individual, or the public from physical injury or address the health care
needs of the individual. 126 Any information disclosed to an officer cannot
be used for any other purpose, disclosed to others, or retained. 127
While ensuring that necessary information is available to all parties in-
volved in the civil commitment process, the General Assembly also took
steps to protect the privacy of information contained in court records. 128
Under current law, the court is required to keep medical records, reports,
and court documents pertaining to civil commitment hearings confidential
only if the individual makes such a request. 129 If the request is not made,
the records are presumed to be open and accessible by the public. 130 In an
attempt to better balance the privacy rights of individuals with the public's
interest in knowing the outcome of commitment proceedings, the General
Assembly reversed the presumption of openness.
Under the new amendments, the court's records, including any medical
records and reports, must be kept confidential unless the individual waives
confidentiality in writing. 131 A person may seek to obtain the dispositional
order by filing a motion with the court explaining why access is needed.
The court may grant the motion and order disclosure of the dispositional
order upon a finding that the disclosure is in the best interests of the subject
of the commitment hearing or of the public. 132
VII. FIREARMS
In reviewing the tragedy at Virginia Tech, the Virginia Tech Review
Panel found that the gunman was prohibited by federal law from purchasing
a firearm because a court determined he was a danger to himself as a result
of mental illness and ordered him to receive outpatient treatment. 133 The
Panel concluded, however, that it was unclear as to whether Cho's outpa-
125. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, ch. 850, 2008
Va. Acts ).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id
129. VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-818 (Repl. Vol. 2005).
130. See id.
131. H.B. 499, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 23, 2008, oh. 850, 2008
Va. Acts ).
132. Id.
133. VA. TECH REVIEW PANEL, supra note 7, at 71.
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tient commitment precluded him from purchasing a gun under Virginia
law. 134 Further, it was unclear whether outpatient commitment orders must
be reported to the Central Criminal Records Exchange or the division of the
state police charged with gathering criminal records and other information
for the background checks database used for potential firearms pur-
chases. 135 Multiple bills were introduced to clarify Virginia's firearms laws
with regard to the mentally ill. 136
Virginia's current law prohibits any person who has been involuntarily
committed from purchasing a firearm. 137 The General Assembly amended
this law to further clarify that any person admitted to a facility or ordered to
MOT as a result of a finding of incompetence to stand trial or as a result of
a commitment hearing is prohibited from purchasing, possessing or trans-
porting a firearm. 138 An additional provision was included, making it
unlawful for a subject of a temporary detention order who subsequently
agrees to voluntary admission pursuant to Virginia Code section 37.2-805
to purchase, possess, or transport a firearm. 139
Further, the General Assembly clarified that the clerk of court must for-
ward orders for treatment to restore competency, involuntary admission to a
facility, and mandatory outpatient treatment to the Central Criminal Re-
cords Exchange.14° The clerk of court must also send certification of any
subject of a temporary detention order who agreed to voluntary admission
to the Central Criminal Records Exchange. 14 1
VIII. INPATIENT PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT OF MINORS ACT
In addition to sweeping changes to the commitment scheme for adults,
the General Assembly also clarified a number of issues related to the Psy-
chiatric Inpatient Treatment of Minors Act.142 Most significantly, it ex-
tended the maximum period of temporary detention from seventy-two to
ninety-six hours to permit additional time for a thorough assessment of the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 72.
136. See, e.g., H.B. 535, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); H.B. 709, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2008); H.B. 835, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); H.B. 1054, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg.
Sess. 2008).
137. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-308.1:3 (Supp. 2007).
138. H.B. 815, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 788, 2008 Va.
Acts j. The commitment hearing should be conducted according to section 37.2-814.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-335 to -348 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Cum. Supp. 2007).
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minor's need for inpatient admission, especially when the child is hospital-
ized at a significant distance from home, such as at the Commonwealth
Center for Children and Adolescents. 143 New legislation also requires the
court to appoint both an attorney to represent the child's position in a com-
mitment hearing as well as a guardian ad litem to represent the best interests
of the child before the court. 144
The General Assembly also closed a gap in the commitment scheme by
adding a definition for a minor incapable of making an informed decision in
section 16.1-336; the same bill provides that such a minor be treated as an
objecting minor age fourteen or older and requires court review under sec-
tions 16.1-339 for admission to a psychiatric facility. 145 By adding the in-
capable of consenting category to minors objecting under section 16.1-339,
the General Assembly has insured that the child will now have a guardian
ad litem appointed for him and a review hearing to protect his rights. In
other legislation, the General Assembly clarified that the petition and notice
of hearing must be served as required under section 16.1-341 if the petition
has not been dismissed or withdrawn. 146
IX. COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES ACT FOR AT-RISK YOUTH AND FAMILIES
In addition to the calls for reform of the mental health system for adults,
the need to establish a continuum of appropriate community services for
children and adolescents peaked in 2006 and 2007. As a result of this lack
of community services, parents were often required to relinquish custody of
their children in order to obtain urgently needed mental health treatment for
them in residential facilities. 147 As a result, the Attorney General issued an
opinion to the Honorable William H. Fralin, Jr. on December 6, 2006,
which advised that "statutory and constitutional provisions require man-
dated services.., be provided to eligible children who are in need of mental
health services without their parents having to relinquish custody to local
social services agencies." 148 The opinion went on to find that some locali-
ties interpreted the definition of a child in need of services too narrowly, re-
143. H.B. 582, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 783, 2008 Va.
Acts 9.
144. S.B. 247, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 807, 2008 Va.
Acts 9.
145. H.B. 400, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 774, 2008 Va.
Acts j.
146. H.B. 402, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 2, 2008, ch. 776, 2008 Va.
Acts 9.
147. See 2006 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 206, 212 (2006).
148. Id.
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quiring a juvenile and domestic relations district court judge to make such a
finding. 149 Even so, section 16.1-281 still requires the filing of a foster care
plan with the court whenever a public agency designated by a community
policy and management team places a child in residential care where legal
custody remains with the parents. 150
Consequently, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 1489 to remove
the requirement of filing foster care plans and court reviews of those plans
for CSA-funded residential placements when parents retain custody of their
child and the case management is done by an agency other than the local
department of social services. 151 As a result, parents will be relieved of the
burden of having to appear in court simply to justify the need for mental
health services.
On January 10, 2007, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commis-
sion (JLARC) issued a report evaluating children's residential services de-
livered through the Comprehensive Services Act (CSA). 152 JLARC found
that one-quarter of the 16,272 children served through the CSA received
services in residential care, the most restrictive setting, at a cost of $194
million. 153 In addition, JLARC concluded that better mechanisms were
needed to control expenditures and that "addressing gaps in the availability
of community-based services would reduce program costs decreasing the
frequency of residential placements for children." 154
As a result of these findings, legislators introduced a number of bills that
ultimately were rolled into two identical bills passed by both the House and
Senate, which require, among other things, the State Executive Council to
oversee the development and implementation of mandatory uniform guide-
lines for intensive care coordination services for children at risk of entering,
or who are placed in, residential care through the CSA-program and each
local community policy and management team to establish policies for pro-
viding intensive care coordination services for these children. 55 In addi-
149. Id. at 210-11.
150. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-281 (Repl. Vol. 2003 & Supp. 2007).
151. H.B. 1489, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 678, 2008
Va. Acts _). The federal government's definition of foster care applies only to those children who are
being case managed by a local department of social services. 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20 (2007).
152. JOINT LEGISLATIVE AUDIT & REVIEW COMM'N OF THE GEN. ASSEMBLY OF VA., EVALUATION OF
CHILDREN'S RESIDENTIAL SERVICES DELIVERED THROUGH THE COMPREHENSIVE SERVICES ACT, H.D.
12 (2007), available at http://leg2.state.va.us/dls/h&sdocs.nsf/By+Year/HD122007/Sfile/HD12.pdf.
153. Id. at i.
154. Id. "Providing a more complete continuum of care would help children access services best suited
to meet their needs and realize the CSA program's original intent of serving youths in their homes and
communities." Id.
155. H.B. 503, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 487, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008)
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tion, these bills require each local family assessment and planning team
(FAPT) to identify children at risk of entering, or who are placed in, resi-
dential care that can be served appropriately and effectively in their homes
or the community. 15 6 The FAPT must then implement a plan for returning
the child to his home or the community at the earliest appropriate time that
addresses the child's needs. 157
Most importantly, the General Assembly reduced the local match rate-
the rate each locality must pay towards the cost of services provided under
the CSA program-for community based services by fifty percent begin-
ning July 1, 2008.158 Beginning January 1, 2009, however, the local match
rate for residential services will be increased by fifteen percent after a local-
ity has incurred $100,000 in residential care expenditures and by twenty-
five percent after a locality has incurred $200,000 in residential expendi-
tures, thus providing financial incentives to localities to deliver services in
community-based settings. 159
X. RESTRUCTURING OF MAGISTRATE SYSTEM
The General Assembly also approved a sweeping restructuring of the
magistrate system, placing magistrates under the supervision of the Execu-
tive Secretary of the Virginia Supreme Court. 160 Among other things, mag-
istrates will be appointed by the Executive Secretary, in consultation with,
rather than by, the chief judge of the circuit.161 Magistrates employed after
July 1, 2008 will be required to have bachelor's degrees, and chief magis-
trates must have law degrees. 162 Each must serve a nine month probation-
ary period and meet minimum training and certification requirements. 163
XI. THE FUTURE
Although the legislation enacted in 2008 was sweeping and historic, the
(incorporating Senate Bills 480, 488, 489, and 658).
156. H.B. 503, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 487, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
157. H.B. 503, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008); S.B. 487, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
158. H.B. 29, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Apr. 11, 2008, ch. 827, 2008 Va.
Acts _); H.B. 30, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of May 9, 2008, ch. 879, 2008
Va. Acts ).
159. Id
160. S.B. 244, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 2008, ch. 691, 2008
Va. Acts ).
161. Id
162. Id.
163. Id.
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General Assembly continued a number of bills for further study. Most sig-
nificantly, Senate Bill 177, modeled after Kendra's Law, 164 would establish
new commitment criteria and a process to permit mandatory assisted outpa-
tient treatment for persons whose psychiatric condition is deteriorating, but
who have not yet met the criteria for involuntary inpatient treatment. 165
Senate Bill 274, permitting a period of mandatory outpatient treatment fol-
lowing a period of involuntary acute hospitalization, 166 and House Bill
1004, establishing mental health advance directives, 167 will be studied this
coming year. 168
The Senate also referred the subject matter of a number of bills to the
Mental Health Law Reform Commission for further study. These include
Senate Bill 47, establishing mental health advance directives; 169 Senate Bill
102, establishing a three-tiered transportation system for persons subject to
a petition for involuntary treatment; 170 Senate Bill 143, extending the period
of temporary detention from forty-eight to ninety-six hours; 171 House Bill
938, creating a right of appeal for petitioners in civil commitment proceed-
ings; 172 and House Bill 267, providing for appointment of counsel for indi-
gent petitioners in the civil commitment process. 173
Additionally, the Commission on Mental Health Law Reform will con-
tinue its work through 2008.174 The Commission will continue to study a
reduced mandatory outpatient commitment criteria and process; a bifurcated
commitment process providing for a period of mandatory outpatient treat-
ment following a period of acute inpatient hospitalization;1 75 a review hear-
ing, separate from a commitment hearing, for persons adjudicated incapaci-
tated but incapable of consenting to their own admission; 176 extension of
the temporary detention period from forty-eight hours to four or five
164. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (Consol. 2007).
165. S.B. 177, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008) (continued to 2009 by the Senate Finance Com-
mittee on Feb. 13, 2008).
166. S.B. 274, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
167. H.B. 1004, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
168. Notably, the General Assembly authorized the establishment of an advance directory registry
within the Department of Health to facilitate the accessibility of these directives to health care providers.
Act of Mar. 4, 2008, ch. 301, 2008 Va. Acts 9.
169. S.B. 47, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
170. S.B. 102, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
171. S.B. 143, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
172. H.B. 938, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
173. H.B. 267, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2008).
174. COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH LAW REFORM, PRELIMINARY REPORT, supra note 11, at iv.
175. See id. at 24.
176. See id. at 21.
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days;1 7 7 and an expanded role for independent examiners. 17 8 The Commis-
sion also plans to continue its study concerning attorney appointment for
petitioners in commitment hearings and a possible a right of appeal. 17 9 It
will also examine whether commitment hearings should continue to be open
to the public. 180 Details for implementation of a three-tiered transportation
system during the commitment process will also be developed with the goal
of permitting transportation by family members, by taxi, or by CSBs in
non-dangerous situations and wheelchair or ambulance transportation when
medical concerns are an issue, reserving law-enforcement transportation for
those cases in which the safety of the person and the public is an issue. 81
The Commission will also consider expansion of CSB mandated services
to include crisis stabilization, case management, outpatient, respite, in-
home, residential, and housing support services. 182 It will focus on enhanc-
ing consumer empowerment and expanding the use of advance directives to
govern all types of health care, including mental health care. 183 It will also
address the realignment of the criminal justice system in an effort to divert
mentally ill persons who do not belong in either the criminal justice system
or jail and seek to develop a recovery-oriented jail re-entry system, which is
a paramount concern.18 4 Diversion of children from the juvenile justice
system will also be a focus of continued study as will the development of
strategies to reduce the use of long term residential care for children. 185
From the establishment of the Virginia Commission on Mental Health
Law Reform and the reforms prompted by the tragedy at Virginia Tech to
the sweeping and historic measures adopted by the General Assembly, 2007
and 2008 were significant years for Virginia's mental health service deliv-
ery system. With increased public awareness of this issue and the legisla-
tion still to be considered by the General Assembly, Virginia has not seen
the end of innovative initiatives in this complex field.
177. See id. at 17.
178. See id. at 20.
179. See id. at21
180. See id. at 22.
181. See id at 19-20 (noting that a reduction in the use of restraints in transportation will also be a ma-
jor focus).
182. See id. at 9.
183. See id. at 13-15.
184. See id. at 27.
185. See id. at 32.
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